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THE FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE AND
THE RELATED ABSTENTION DOCTRINE1
CHAMML.S W. KNOWLTON::
I. INTRODUCTION
The very existence in this country of a system of federal
courts and fifty sets of state courts makes it inevitable that there
will be collisions between the two systems. It is imperative that
state and federal courts operate in an atmosphere of harmony,
or at least mutual respect, and not as antagonists in a power
struggle. To that end there should be reasonably clear standards
governing whether one court may or should intrude upon an
action pending or threatened in another court.
I suggest that it is fruitless to argue whether one system is
paramount or superior to the other, whether they are merely
concurrent, or whether one system has a better set of judges
than the other. In the latter connection, it has been said:
Though each system of courts moves in a sphere of
special competence, there is no reason to believe that
a state court is more likely to err in its legal analysis,
more likely to flout legal precedent, or more likely to
entertain improper litigation than is a federal court.2
In short, it is not the purpose here to philosophize but to dis-
cuss the practical difficulties and the standards which govern
when a federal court is requested to enjoin a proceeding in a
* A.B., University of South Carolina; L.L.B., Harvard Lav School;
member of the firm Boyd, Bruton, Knowlton & Tate, Columbia, S. C.
1. This is an expansion of a paper delivered before the Judicial Conference
of the Fourth Circuit in July, 1968. Separate treatment of the anti-injunction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), and the abstention doctrine by text writers
has been excellent. See, e.g., 1(a) MooRE's 1961 FEDERAL PRAcTICE §§ 0.203
et. seq. and §§ 208 et. seq.; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs §§ 47-52 (1963); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Pro-
ceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. Rv.
1145 (1932); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Revisited, 32 TEX. L. REy. 815
(1953) ; Note, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32
U. CHI. L. Rv. 471 (1965) ; Anno. 20 L. ED. 2d 1623. However, there seems
to be a lack of text treatment of situations which involve both doctrines and
their relationships to each other. Perhaps some scholar, impressed with the
inadequacies of my effort, will be inspired to do a proper job.
2. Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L.
Rnv. 726, 727 (1961).
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state court. There is also a suggested analytical approach which
might eliminate some confusion when a court is considering
both the statutory barriers to a stay and the non-statutory
abstention doctrine.
There are two sets of limitations upon the federal courts and
neither has a constitutional origin. The first, sometimes called
the anti-injunction statute, reads in its entirety as follows:
A court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a State Court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."
Again, to limit the scope of discussion somewhat, scholars have
found little help in the legislative history surrounding the
original adoption of this statute in 1793. There are various
conflicting theories as to the motives of Congress but none are
of any real help in its interpretation.4 I would also suggest
that, with this ancient parentage of the statute, the debates
between John C. Calhoun and Daniel Webster have nothing to
do with the matter. The limitation of the statute is neither con-
tained nor suggested in article III of the Constitution, which
establishes federal court jurisdiction, and, therefore, for what-
ever motive, the Congress in 1793 must have meant business
when it imposed a sizeable barrier to injunctions against state
court proceedings. Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter was cor-
rect when he repeatedly stated that the statute was designed
"to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts."5
In addition to the statute, another limitation upon injunc-
tions against state court actions was created and has been con-
tinued by the federal judiciary itself. This is the so-called
abstention doctrine under which a federal court may conclude
that it will not immediately intervene in a state court contro-
versy, directing the parties to pursue state remedies, sometimes
retaining jurisdiction and awaiting the outcome of the state
litigation. Thus, a federal judge may have a more complicated
choice than Hamlet:
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
4. See the historical discussion and sources cited by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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1. to stay or not to stay; or
2. whether to do nothing at all for the time being.
While abstention is somewhat a matter of the exercise of wise
discretion, it is not merely a matter of whimsy. Neither are the
questions under the statute. Such concepts as the length of the
chancellor's foot, or the audacity (or lack of it) on the part of
the federal judge have no place here.
In considering these limitations, we face not only the limits
of the limitations but questions such as: Do the limits overlap
or are they coextensive? Which must be considered first? Can
cases invoking federal constitutional questions override both?
Although originating from different branches of the federal
government, the doctrines are necessarily related by marriage if
not by blood. Although each has vitality, one is often ignored
in a given case which produces confusion as to their exact re-
lationship. As will be shown below, in some cases a stay could
have been denied on both statutory and abstention grounds, but
only one ground was even discussed. In other cases an injunc-
tion has been granted without a very satisfactory explanation
of the route through or around the two barriers.
More methodical analysis by courts, treatise writers and law-
yers might not change the results in many of these cases but it
could produce a clarity which is lacking. Clearer understanding
is particularly needed concerning the relationship of the statute
and the abstention doctrine and the areas barred by one but
not the other. A step by step approach which I would suggest
that a federal could or lawyer can take in considering a prayer
for a stay against state court proceedings would be as follows:
1. Is an injunction barred by statute? It is so
barred unless:
(a) the case comes within one of the three exceptions
recited in § 2288; or
(b) a proceeding is not actually pending in state
court; or
(c) the United States seeks the stay in its sovereign
capacity.
3
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2. Even if the statute is no bar to an injunction, the
abstention doctrine may require the federal court to stay its
own proceedings if:
(a) a state court interpretation or determination is
necessary or desirable before determining whether
an alleged violation of the United States Con-
stitution exists; or
(b) the stay would be a needless interference with the
administration by a state with its own affairs; or
(c) the parties should obtain a state court adjudica-
tion of state law questions which are exception-
ally difficult, unclear or unlitigated.
3. Even if the statute or the abstention doctrine would
normally prevent a stay of state court proceedings, the court
may be under a duty in an aggravated case to issue a stay order
because there is clear and imminent danger of irreparable dam-
age by manifestly unconstitutional acts.
4. If no stay of state proceedings is sought, the anti-injunc-
tion statute does not apply but the federal court may be required
to stay its own proceedings by the abstention doctrine. There
are cases in which the anti-injunction statute is no barrier but
the court is required to abstain from a decision on the merits.
A summary of the two doctrines follows.
II. TE ANTI-INZYuNxCION STATUTE
The statutory bar has been applied to a number of different
types of subject matter. A fairly classic type is parallel insur-
ance litigation. An insurer may commence an action in federal
court seeldng a declaratory judgment concerning a coverage
question or its duty to defend a given claim alleged by the
insured to be covered by the policy. At the same time, there
may be pending in state court tort actions against the insured
who has demanded a defense. Pursuant to the statute, the
courts have consistently denied a request for injunction against
the state court actions and each action has proceeded to its own
independent conclusion. 6 In addition to § 2283, there are some
similar statutes of more limited application which prevent
federal courts from enjoining the assessment of state taxes
6. E.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
[Vol. 21
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where there is an adequate remedy in state court7 and which
prohibit injunctions against rate orders of state agencies.8
As seen in § 2283 itself, there are three categories of excep-
tions to the prohibition. In its original version, the prohibition
was absolute on the face of the statute.9 Exceptions were
carved out by judicial decisions until 1948 when it was amended
to add specific exceptions. The first statutory exception permits
such an injunction when it is expressly authorized by an Act
of Congress. It seems clear that statutory authority for such an
injunction does not have to make specific reference to the
anti-injunction statute. 10 As will be seen, however, the statuory
ground of power to stay must be clearly and affimatively
granted. For example, the Bankruptcy Act has various provi-
sions giving a bankruptcy court such powers in various
situations to protect its jurisdiction over the debtor, the debtor's
assets and the orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate.
In the garden variety bankruptcy case, in which the assets are
assembled, priority of claims determined, and the assets dis-
tributed pro rata, there are few problems or serious questions
about the bankruptcy court's powers. It can clearly stay state
court foreclosure or attachment proceedings against the various
properties of the bankrupt."1 It can stay pending cases involving
dischargeable claims and require that they be proved in the
bankruptcy court.
12
There are types of bankruptcy, however, which involve re-
organization rather than liquidation and distribution, in which
the bankruptcy court has less power to enjoin a state court
action. Among the reorganization cases, an interesting example
is Calaway v. Benton.18 There the Central of Georgia Rail-
road entered into reorganization proceedings under Section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act.' 4 The bankrupt was the lessee of rail-
road properties of South Western Railroad Company. After
some proceedings in the bankruptcy court, South Western pro-
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
8. Id. § 1342.
9. "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted [by any court of the United
States] to stay proceedings in any court of a state .... " Act of March 2,
1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.
10. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
11. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11.02 (J. Moore ed. 1968).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
13. 336 U.S. 132 (1949).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
5
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posed to convey its property to the Central in exchange for
bonds in a court approved plan. Some of its stockholders
brought a state court action to enjoin the sale as lacking ap-
proval required by state law. The Supreme Court held that the
bankruptcy court was prohibited by the anti-injunction Act
from staying the state court action, although arguably it was an
attack on consummation of the plan of reorganization; that the
corporate procedures to authorize the sale were strictly a ques-
tion of state law and governed by no provision in the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The Court stated in part:
We do not believe that Congress intended to leave to
individual judges the question of whether state laws
should be accepted or disregarded. There can be no
question, however, that Congress did not give the Bank-
ruptcy Court exclusive jurisdiction over all controver-
sies that in some way affect the debtor's estate ....
What it did give was exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property wherever located.15
Another affirmative statutory injunctive power is contained
in the Interpleader Act.' 6 This is a procedure by which multi-
ple claimants to a fund or particular item of property have
their claims determined by the federal court. The statute grant-
ing the remedy provides specifically that the interpleader court
shall have power to issue its process against claimants to the
fund or property and to issue an order against each, enjoining
them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or proceeding
in any state court or any other federal court. But even here
it has been properly held that the court may be required to lift
its stay to permit decision of a state law property question.1
7
Even though a federal statute has created a body of federal
law which may in large measure preempt the field, it does not
always follow that this grants injunctive power to the federal
court against any and every state court action. In the labor
field, the Labor-Management Relations Act' s has, to a large
extent, preempted the subject matter of labor-management rela-
15. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1949); cf. Carolina Pipeline
Co. v. York County Natural Gas Authority, 388 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1967).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964).
17. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Copeland, 398 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1968);
Hickok v. Gulf Oil Corp., 265 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1959).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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tions.19 It does not follow, however, that state court jurisdiction
can always be ousted by reliance upon the labor statute. An
example of this fact is contained in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Brothers.2 0 There in a labor dispute the
employer sought injunctive relief in the state court against the
labor union. The Union asked the federal court to stay the
proceedings upon the ground that the subject matter was an
exclusive federal matter under the federal statute. The Supreme
Court (per Frankfurter) held that such a stay was improper
under the § 2283 prohibition.
In so holding, he stated: "By that enactment, Congress made
clear beyond cavil that the prohibition [of § 2283] is not to be
whittled away by judicial improvisation. '21 This was a diffi-
cult decision, because the Court had previously held that the
NLRB could obtain a stay (under § 1337) against a state court
injunction proceeding.2 2 The distinction is apparently that the
labor statute gives the injunctive remedy only to the NLRB.
The remaining two exceptions in § 2283 were added in 1948
largely to change the Supreme Court decision in Toucey v. New
York Life Insurance Co.28 In that case, Toucey had brought
an action originally in state court alleging a breach of contract
of insurance for disability. The action was removed to federal
court. The company won and no appeal was taken. Later,
Toucey assigned his claim to another person in order to make
removal impossible and attempted to sue the company again to
collect his disability claim. The company sought an injunction
against this second action and it was granted by the lower
courts. However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding, in
effect, that the company would have to defend on the ground
of res judcata.
The 1948 amendments added the additional exceptions of the
statute which permit an injunction (a) if it is necessary in aid
of the federal court's jurisdiction (already there by judicial in-
terpretation), or (b) to protect or effectuate its judgments.
24
An injunction to protect or effectuate the judgment of a
19. See Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
20. 348 U.S. 511 (1955) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Richman]
21. Id. at 514.
22. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
23. 314 U.S. 118 (1941) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Toucey].
24. 62 Stat 968, ch. 646 (1948).
7
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federal court permits an injunction like that sought in the
Toucey case to prevent the relitigation of a claim already
decided by the federal court.
The exception permitting an injunction in aid of the juris-
diction of a federal court is in line with previous judicial
decisions prior to the Toucey case which carved out exceptions
to the statute by judicial interpretation. For example, when a
case is removed to federal court, if necessary, the court can
enjoin the plaintiff from pursuing the same action in any state
court.
2 5
The aid of federal jurisdiction exception was relied upon by
the Supreme Court in another labor case, Capital Service, Inc.
v. NLRB,28 in which the stay was sought by the NLRB against
state court injunction proceedings in subject matter over which
the NLRB alleged to have had exclusive jurisdiction under the
National Labor Relations Act. The Richman case (supra) did
not overrule Capital Service. Richman denied a stay to a private
party under § 2283, but a federal agency in the same subject
matter is not barred because of this exception in the statute.
The same exception of the aid of federal jurisdiction has pro-
duced decisions to the effect that § 2283 does not bar an injunc-
tion sought by the United States in the exercise of its sovereign
power against the state court proceeding. 27 While this may
be difficult to read into the statute, it should be borne in mind
that the statute is one of judicial policy or comity rather than
a constitutional or jurisdictional concept.
In this context, it is an interesting inquiry to ask whether
or not a state court in proper circumstances may stay or pre-
vent the bringing of an action in federal court. Without
developing this in detail, it can be said as a general proposition
that state court attempts to do so have met with limited suc-
cess. In the case of Donovan v. City of Dallas, 28 the Supreme
Court decided, in effect, that what is sauce for the goose is not
necessarily sauce for the gander. A group of plaintiffs lost
their case in a Texas state court29 (an attack on a bond issue),
25. French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1875).
26. 347 U.S. 501 (1954) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Capital
Service].
27. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
28. 337 U.S. 408 (1964) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Donovan].
29. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W2d 275 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1961).
8
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and then commenced another action in the United States Dis-
trict Court of Texas on the same subject matter. The defendants
sought and obtained a stay against further proceedings by the
plaintiffs from a state court in Texas. This may be a classic case
on courts harrumphing about their prerogatives. When they
continued to press their federal case, eighty-seven plaintiffs
were convicted and punished for contempt by the Texas court.
Donovan, the attorney for the plaintiffs, served 20 days in a
Texas jail. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction after
Mr. Donovan's unsuccessful attempts to get a writ of habeas
corpus from either a state or federal court. Although this was
the classic relitigation situation which the 1948 amendments
put into § 2283, it was held that the state court was without
power to enjoin the federal action. The result was that the
defendants had to establish their plea of res judicata in the
second case. The logic of the Donovan case has been at-
tacked, but it does have historical support.30 The same remind-
er is again appropriate that § 2283 is not a jurisdictional or con-
stitutional concept. When federal jurisdiction clearly exists as
in Donovan and as granted by federal law, the states are with-
out power to do anything about it. I submit that this is not
any new demise of state's rights. "Though the federal courts
are not superior to state courts, federal law is supreme over
state law. .. -31
There is a line of in rem cases in which the state courts, with
the blessings of the Supreme Court, have successfully stayed a
federal court action. In Princess Lida v. Thompson8 2 a trustee
and the beneficiaries brought a state court action to compel
specific performance of a trust against the settlor. The bene-
ficiary then brought a federal court action against the trustees
for mismanagement. Each court issued an injunction against
prosecution of the other action. The Supreme Court broke the
log jam and upheld the state court injunction upon the ground
that it had prior jurisdiction of the r'es (the trust). The test
should not necessarily be a race to the court house, yet here
is an area for federal jurisdiction yielding to state jurisdiction.
30. See Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts,
32 U. CHi. L. REv. 471, especially 498-502 (1965).
31. ALI Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts, at 236 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1966).
32. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
9
Knowlton: The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and the Related Abstention Do
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAroLINA LAW REVIEW
III. THE ABSTENTION DoOEiNE
This doctrine has been fashioned and perpetuated by the
federal courts themselves and never by statute. As will be
shown, however, there are indications that some purportedly ab-
stention cases are adding an exception to § 2283. Again, this is a
rule of policy and comity rather than an abandonment of power
or jurisdiction. There is considerable confusion in this area be-
cause of the absence of a step-by-step analysis of the statutory
and judicial doctrines. Under the abstention doctrine, a federal
court simply declines to pass upon the merits and leaves the
parties to their state remedies. Sometimes it appropriately re-
tains jurisdiction and awaits the determination of state issues
of insurance for disability; the action was removed to federal
decision of federal issues resulting from the state determination.
Sometimes it simply dismisses, leaving the parties solely to their
state remedies. Abstention may also be an appropriate step to
take in an application of § 2283 whereby the federal proceed-
ings are merely delayed rather than totally barred, reserving
the federal questions for later decision.
There is a large body of cases requiring abstention in which
apparently the anti-injunction statute does not apply, either
because there was no state court action pending or because it
was within one of the exceptions to the statute. One of the
earliest decisions was Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co.33 There the commission had ordered that no sleeping car
could be operated in the state of Texas unless such cars were
continuously in charge of an employee having the rank of pull-
man conductor. The company attacked the order before a three-
judge federal court and obtained an injunction against its
enforcement on the ground that it was not authorized by Texas
law and that it violated the equal protection, due process and
commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. With no
reference to § 2283 (but apparently assuming its inapplicability
-no state court action pending) the Supreme Court reversed
the order of injunction below and directed the district court to
retain jurisdiction pending a determination of proceedings to
be brought by the parties in state court, stating:
[T]he last word on the statutory authority of the Rail-
road Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor
33. 312 U.S. 496 (1941) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Pullman].
[Vol. "21
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to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas.
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to
decide an issue by making a tentative answer which
may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication
. . . . The reign of law is hardly promoted if an un-
necessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted
by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources
of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a
premature constitutional adjudication. 34
In the non-statutory abstention situation, there are several
categories of cases. First, there is the situation in which state
action is challenged in the federal court as being void under the
United States Constitution, when there are state questions upon
which the federal question must depend. This is exemplified by
the Pullman case (supra). The result in this category is that the
federal court avoids deciding a federal constitutional issue pre-
maturely, or sometimes unnecessarily, as a state court ruling
may make a federal constitutional ruling unnecessary. The
federal court often retains jurisdiction as it did in Pullman
until the state litigation is finished.
Another branch of judicial abstention is a rule of self re-
straint against exercising federal jurisdiction in order to avoid
needless conflict with the administration by a' state of its own
affairs; i.e., collection of taxes and interpretation of its taxing
statutes and enforcement of its criminal law.3 5 Usually, but
not always, the federal court simply dismisses and does not re-
tain further jurisdiction.
There is a third category of abstention in which the federal
court declines to exercise its jurisdiction when it would have
to decide unusually difficult, unclear, or unlitigated questions
of state law. Of course, under the Erie doctrine the federal
courts decide state law questions all the time, especially in the
area of tort litigation. However, this is a matter of applying
well-known doctrines to different factual situations. Thus,
there are difficult questions and then there are more difficult
questions. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.36 is an example
34. Id. at 500.
35. Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
36. 309 U.S. 478 (1940) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Thompson];
cf. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
11
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of this third category. There a railroad was in reorganization
under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 37 and the question arose be-
tween the trustee and certain other claimants as to who had the
legal right to drill for oil under the bankrupt railroad's right-of-
way over a newly discovered oil field. The Supreme Court con-
cluded that it was desirable for the parties to litigate this
question in the state court because it involved unsettled ques-
tions of state property law which should not be properly ad-
judicated in the course of a bankruptcy administration; but the
Court did not mention § 2283.
An interesting way out of the difficult state law question situ-
ation has arisen in recent years. If the states follow up on this
avenue, it may be the proper answer in some instances. Some
states have a statutory procedure whereby questions of law may
be certified to the supreme court of the state. Several times in
the last few years, the United States Supreme Court has fol-
lowed this avenue, abstaining until it receives answers from its
certified questions to the state court of last resort.38 This is an
interesting approach, but it will not handle all cases. There
first must be a clear-cut procedural avenue for the certification
of questions to the state supreme court by a federal court. This
exists in only four states. 39 I would suggest, moreover, that this
procedure will not work when there are factual issues involved
in the controversy and, in the exercise of abstention, the par-
ties must proceed with their state remedies beginning at the
trial court level. Under the certificate method, however, the un-
clear or unlitigated state question can receive its final determi-
nation from the place that it should, namely, the supreme court
of a state, thus furnishing the predicate for adjudication of
federal issues by the abstaining federal court.
In the constitutional type of abstention cases, there have been
numerous abstentions. There is a growing body of law, however,
requiring the federal court to face a choice of two opposite
duties: first, a duty to abstain, and second, a duty in a proper
case to intervene and decide the constitutional issue on the
merits, restraining the state courts rather than permitting the
37. 11 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
38. Dresner v. Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375
U.S. 249 (1963).
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961); HAvAii REV. LAWS (1955); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit 4, § 57 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60 (1964).
12
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state litigation to proceed. Decisions here, often in a civil
rights context, have gone both ways.
In Harrison v. NAACP,40 there was an action to declare the
Virginia statutes against barratry unconstitutional on the
grounds that, while a proper subject of state regulation, they
were void for "overbreadth" in that they went too far in the
exercise of state police power and trespassed upon free speech
and other federally protected rights. The required three-judge
court found some of the statutes unconstitutional on their face
and enjoined enforcement by the state. Citing the Pullman case,
the Supreme Court held that the district court should have
abstained and waited state interpretation of the statute. Like-
wise, in Meridian v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.41 the Supreme Court reversed a holding that a state statute
imposing a use charge upon utilities was unconstitutional. In
so doing, it also relied upon the difficult state law question,
as in Thompson, stating that "the state law problems are deli-
cate ones, the resolution of which is not without substantial
difficulty, certainly for a federal court."42 It was held that the
lower court should have abstained and retained jurisdiction
until the state interpretation was obtained.
While Thompson is probably confined to similar bankruptcy
situations, there are others of general application like the
Meridian case. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,4 3
a condemnation action was removed to federal court on the
ground of diversity and the proposed taking was challenged.
The district judge, on his own motion, ordered abstention until
the Supreme Court of Louisiana could interpret the condemna-
tion statute. Although the statute was old, it was unclear and
had never been judicially interpreted. An early opinion of the
state's attorney general, moreover, cast doubt upon the city's
power to take. The court of appeals reversed, 44 but the Supreme
Court decided that the district judge had acted properly by re-
taining jurisdiction awaiting an interpretation of the statute
by a state court declaratory judgment action.
40. 360 U.S. 167 (1959) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Harrison].
41. 358 U.S. 639 (1959).
42. Id. at 640.
43. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
44. 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES WHICH: CAN REQUIm
FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION
There is a category of cases which straddle all of these prob-
lems of statutory and judicial restraint upon federal courts with
the added problem of the traditionally greater reluctance to
intervene in state court criminal proceedings. In each of these
cases there was an allegation that the state criminal statute
involved was void under the United States Constitution. This
line of cases begins with Douglas v. City of Jeanette.4 5 Douglas
was an action by a group of Jehovah's Witnesses to enjoin
prosecution under a city soliciting ordinance which allegedly
infringed their rights to free speech. Federal relief was sought
under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 4 The Supreme Court held
that while the lower court had jurisdiction to decide the ques-
tion, there were insufficient grounds for an injunction against
state court prosecution unless it was apparent that injunctive
relief was necessary to prevent irreparable injury which was
clear and imminent. It, therefore, continued the rule of comity
enunciated in the Pullman case, but suggested an exception.
One problem with some of these cases is that they either fail
to mention § 2283, or fail to decide its applicability. It would
seem that the first step would be to consider whether the statute
is a barrier and then enter the murky area of judge-made rules
on abstention. However, § 2283 is frequently confined to foot-
notes, the court saying that the question was not reached.
The Supreme Court has said that a mere allegation that a
state statute is unconstitutional does not prevent abstention.47
This proposition is sound because two things may happen in the
state litigation. First, the state court may strike the statute
down under the state constitution. Second, the state court may
so limit the statute by interpretation that it removes the con-
stitutional problem.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit wrestled with
this problem in Baines v. City of Danville48 in 1964. There
45. 319 U.S. 157 (1943) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Douglas].
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
47. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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various actions were brought in the district court seeking in-
junctions against prosecution as a result of civil rights demon-
strations, involving a city ordinance limiting demonstrations
and picketing. Also involved was some state injunctions as well
as criminal prosecutions as a result of this conduct. The district
judge declined to enjoin the pending criminal prosecutions. The
court of appeals issued temporary restraining orders pending
appeal but, after argument, dismissed the orders and remanded
for consideration of the appropriateness of the injunction
against future arrests. It was held that the anti-injunction
statute barred a stay unless the principle of comity was over-
ridden by constitutional considerations. The court pointed out
that the statute and the abstention doctrine under Douglas are
rules of comity but not absolute jurisdictional bars.
Subsequent to Harrison and Baines were two Supreme Court
cases holding that a district court (1) was in error in abstain-
ing under Douglas and, (2) was under an affirmative duty to
enjoin enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional state
statute.4 9 In each case a declaratory judgment of unconstitu-
tionality was sought as well as an injunction against enforce-
ment. Douglas was distinguished on several grounds, one of
which was the allegation that the statutes were unconstitutional
on their face.
Dombrowski v. Pfister" was an attack upon Louisiana
statutes on subversive activities and the "Communist Propa-
ganda Control Law." Plaintiffs were active in the Negro civil
rights movement and claimed threatened prosecutions did not
really seek convictions but were designed to harass and limit
their right to free speech. The three-judge court dismissed upon
motion. Citing the landmark case of Em parte Young5' the
Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutes were justifiably
attacked on their face. In a footnote the Court stated that since
indictments had not been obtained there was no state proceed-
ing pending and, therefore, § 2283 had no application-a
rather undignified way to relegate the anti-injunction statute
to second class status. The dissent also discussed § 2283 in a
49. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).
50. 380 U.S. 479 (1965) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Dombrowski].
51. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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footnote saying the statute would be a bar had the state prose-
cautions commenced first.
In Zwiekler v. Koota5 2 declaratory and injunctive relief was
sought against a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting distribution
of anonymous political handbills. Plaintiff had obtained a state
court reversal of his conviction on non-constitutional grounds.
The three-judge court abstained and ordered dismissal. The
Supreme Court reversed. It held that the lower court had a
duty to decide the merits of the prayer for a declaratory judg-
ment, irrespective of whether it felt circumstances justified
injunctive relief. The conctirring opinion pointed out that the
mere pleading of unconstitutional overbreadth and a prayer for
declaratory judgment should not necessarily prevent abstention.
The latest word in this series is Cameron v. Johnson.53 The
plaintiffs brought an action in district court seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Mississippi anti-picketing law was an
overly broad and vague regulation of expression and, therefore,
void on its face. They also sought a permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the statute, as an infringement of
free speech and as a plan of selective enforcement solely to dis-
courage plaintiffs from picketing in protest of racial discrimin-
ation. A three-judge court dismissed the action on the ground
that extraordinary relief of injunction was not justified and
because of the abstention doctrine. On its first trip to the
Supreme Court, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration
in the light of the Dombrowski decision and to determine speci-
fically whether § 2283 was a bar.54 Upon remand, the three-
judge court, after hearing evidence, dismissed the action with
prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed. The majority in
Cameron had evidently lost interest in § 2283, referring to it
again only in a footnote, saying that it was unnecessary to re-
solve the question. On the merits, it upheld the conclusion that
the statute was a valid law dealing with conduct subject to regu-
lations, and although free speech was involved the statute did
not infringe upon constitutional barriers. The Court dis-
tinguished Dombrowski with the assertion that the case involved
"the impropriety of state officials invoking the statute in bad
52. 389 U.S. 241 (1967) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Zwickler].
53. 390 U.S. 611 (1968) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Camero,].
54. 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
[Vol. '21
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faith to impose continuing harrassment in order to discourage
appellant's activities." 55 In Cameron, the Court found neither
harrassment, intimidation nor oppression. Rather, it found good
faith prosecution for deliberate violation of a valid statute. The
Court further stated that the question for the district court was
not the guilt or innocence of plaintiffs but whether the enforce-
ment was being attempted with no expectation of convictions
but only to discourage the exercise of federally protected rights.
This seems to reaffirm the holding in Zwickler that the absten-
tion doctrine does not limit jurisdiction.
In evaluating Cameron, one should not regard it as a power
shift in the Supreme Court after Dombrowski and Zoikler.
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in all three cases.
It appears that the anti-injunction barriers are real and, where
applicable, can be overridden only an in extraordinary case in-
volving a constitutional problem and an aggravated set of facts.
The Supreme Court in Dombrowski declined to decide
whether the older Civil Rights Act 50 created a statutory excep-
tion to § 2283. In the constitutionally protected civil rights
field, however, the projected course seems to lead around the
anti-injunction statute. Either the exception to the statute will
be found or, following the lead of Dombrowskli, the Court may
find that a constitutional attack on the face of a State statute
raises a constitutional duty paramount to § 2283.
I do not agree with the eminent authors of a 1932 law review
article that § 2283 "has long been dead." 57 Constitutional duties
are one thing (although forever debatable on the merits), but
extraordinary remedies do not always follow.
V. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSALS
At the request of Chief Justice Warren, the American Law
Institute has addressed itself to various problems connected
with the relationship between state and federal court systems
and specifically the anti-injunction statute and the abstention
doctrine. In a draft entitled "Study of the Division of Juris-
diction Between State and Federal Courts" it has proposed new
55. 390 U.S. 611, 619 (1968), quoting from 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
57. Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MicH. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
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statutes covering this subject matter. They are proposed as
§§ 1371, 1372, and 1373 of Title 28, U.S. Code. The text of these
sections is reproduced, infra, as an appendix. While it is be-
yond the purpose of this article to detail the impact of these
new sections, if passed by Congress, some comments are in order.
Proposed § 1371 would, for the first time, codify the absten-
tion doctrines into statutory law. Proposed § 1372 would be an
amendment to § 2283, the anti-injunction act. Proposed § 1373
would, for the first time, enact a statute covering the area in
which a state court may or may not grant a stay against federal
court proceedings.
The main approach of these proposed statutes seems to
be to clarify and codify rather than make extensive substantive
changes in existing law. The reader who has struggled this far
can at least agree that further clarity is needed. It is regrettable
that the courts have not been able to produce this clarity. At
least part of the difficulty was occasioned by the frequent fail-
ure of the courts to measure a problem against both the anti-
injunction statute and the abstention doctrine. Such an ap-
proach will be necessary to maintain clarity even under the new
statutes, if passed.
In an abstention situation, it will leave the litigation of the
unusual, difficult or unresolved abstention question where it
should be; namely, the state court with review on the merits by
the United States Supreme Court. Hopefully, this will help
district courts resist the temptation to attempt to be reviewing
authorities of state law problems and avoid the embarrassment
of the erroneous interpretations of state law. Interim relief can
be given to prevent irreparable harm. However, it is to be
hoped that each system of courts will fish in its own substantive
waters.
The exceptions enumerated in the anti-injunction statute, as
proposed, would be clearer, particularly in the area of civil
rights cases.
Proposed § 1373 will change the result of the Donovan case
and permit state court stays against federal proceedings to pre-
vent harassing relitigation or to protect the jurisdiction of the
court or property in its custody.
[Vol. 21
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VI. CONCLUSION
The systems of state and federal courts must continue to
navigate on parallel rather than collision courses. There is the
obvious need for uniform interpretation of federal law and the
protection of federally granted rights. There is a correspond-
ing need within a given state for uniform interpretation of
state law and the protection of state-granted rights. The anti-
injunction act and its cousin, abstention, are necessary doc-
trines. To bury either of them would produce a kind of judicial
chaos and unnecessary whipsawing of litigants which the federal
courts themselves would wish to avoid. The barriers to intru-
sion by one system upon the other's jurisdiction are real, but
their exact delineation by the courts has sometimes been less
than clear. The complex problems facing the judiciary today,
and in the future, make it imperative that the relationship be-
tween state and federal judicial systems be uppermost in the
minds of the judges in both systems.
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THE STATUTORY CHANGES RECOMMENDED
BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
§ 1371. Abstention and stays in certain cases
(a) A district court shall stay any action to enjoin, suspend,
or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under
State law, or for a declaratory judgment with regard thereto,
if a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.
(b) A district court shall stay any action to enjoin, suspend,
or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order of
any administrative agency of a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, or for a declaratory judgment with regard thereto,
if: (1) the order affects rates chargeable by a public utility,
or the conservation, production, or use of minerals, water, or
other like natural resource of the State; and (2) the order has
been made after reasonable notice and hearing and (3) a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State; and (4) the power of the State to make such order has
not been superseded by any Act of Congress or administrative
regulation thereunder.
(c) A district court may stay an action, otherwise properly
commenced in or removed to a district court under this title,
on the ground that the action presents issues of State law that
ought to be determined in a State proceeding, if the court
finds: (1) that the issues of State law cannot be satisfactorily
determined in the light of the State authorities; and (2) that
abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is warranted
either by the likelihood that the necessity for deciding a sub-
stantial question of federal constitutional law may thereby be
avoided, or by a serious danger of embarrassing the effectuation
of State policies by a decision of State law at variance with the
view which may be ultimately taken by the State court, or by
other circumstances of like character; and (3) that a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State; and (4) that the parties' claims of federal right, if any,
including any issues of fact material thereto, can be adequately
20
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protected by review of the State court decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
(d) In all cases commenced in or removed to a district court,
in which stay of the action pending resort to a State proceeding
is required or permitted by subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this
section, the district court upon granting such a stay shall retain
jurisdiction. It may enter a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or give other interim relief, if such
relief from the district court is necessary to prevent irreparable
harm. If the case was removed to a district court, the court
shall remand it to the State court for determination, subject
to such interim orders as the district court may have made. If
the State proceeding proves ineffective in reaching a prompt
and final disposition on the merits, the district court may vacate
its stay after hearing upon ten days' notice served upon all par-
ties and upon the attorney general of the State, and thereafter
may proceed to judgment without regard to subsections (a),
(b), and (c) of this section. Unless the stay is vacated the
action shall not proceed further in the district court, and the
judgment of the State court shall be reviewable in the Supreme
Court to the extent provided by section 1257 of this title.
(e) A court of the United States may certify to the highest
court of a State a question of State law, if (1) the State has
established a procedure by which its highest court may answer
questions certified from such court of the United States; (2)
the question of State law may be controlling in the action and
cannot be satisfactorily determined in the light of the State
authorities; and (3) the court expressly finds that certifica-
tion will not cause undue delay or be prejudicial to the parties.
(f) Except as provided in this section, no court of the United
States shall stay any action commenced in or removed to a dis-
trict court under this title for the purpose of obtaining a de-
cision as to the law of the State from a State court. Nothing
in this section, however, shall preclude any court of the United
States from exercising its discretion to deny equitable relief or
to decline to entertain an action for a declaratory judgment or
to continue an action until the determination of a pending case
in a State court in which the same issue of law is involved.
(g) This section is inapplicable, and the district court shall
proceed to judgment, in actions to redress the denial under
19691
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color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of the right to vote or of the equal protection of the
laws, if such denial is alleged to be on the basis of race, creed,
color, or national origin. This section is also inapplicable, and
the district court shall proceed to judgment, in actions brought
by the United States or an officer or agency thereof.
§ 1372. Stay of State court p'oceedings.
A court of the United States shall not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court, including the enforcement
of a judgment of a State court unless such an injunction is
otherwise warranted, and: (1) an Act of Congress authorizes
such relief or provides that other proceedings shall cease; or
(2) the injunction is requested by the United States, or an
officer or agency thereof; or (3) the injunction is necessary to
protect the jurisdiction of the court over property in its cus-
tody or subject to its control; or (4) the injunction is in aid of
a claim for interpleader; or (5) the injunction is necessary to
protect or effectuate an existing judgment of the court; or (6)
the injunction is sought to preserve temporarily the status quo
pending determination of whether this section permits grant
of a permanent injunction; or (7) the injunction is to restrain
a criminal prosecution that should not be permitted to continue
either because the statute or other law that is the basis of the
prosecution plainly cannot constitutionally be. applied to the
party seeking the injunction or because the prosecution is so
plainly discriminatory as to amount to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
§ 1373. Stay of federal court proceedings
A State court shall not grant an injunction to stay the insti-
tution or prosecution of proceedings in a court of the United
States, or the enforcement of a judgment of a court of the
United States, unless such an injunction is otherwise warranted,
and: (1) the injunction is necessary to protect the jurisdiction
of the court over property in its custody or subject to its con-
trol; or (2) the injunction is necessary to protect against vexa-
tions and harassing relitigation of matters determined by an
existing judgment of the State court in a civil action.
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